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 “Open space has been often cited as a primary attractor of urban and suburban residents 
to exurban areas located just beyond the metropolitan fringe”  
--Irwin and Bockstael, 2001, p. 691  
 
For residents deciding where to locate their homes, areas with wide availability of 
open space are much coveted as they are rich in rural and natural amenities, scenic 
landscapes, and because such areas provide diverse opportunities for amenity based 
recreational activities. Perhaps more importantly, as observed by Irwin and Bockstael, 
areas endowed with open space are perceived to be dissociated from many environmental 
disamenities, like vehicular congestion and air pollution, that are associated with more 
developed areas (Irwin and Bockstael, 2001). In essence, open space is representative of 
all that which is natural and untouched by the negative externalities that are taken to be 
the by-product of commercial development and urbanization. It is an important 
characteristic of the bundle of attributes that defines residential goods and over which 
residential consumers have preferences.  
Spurred on by the importance of open space as a source of residential amenities, 
and with urban sprawl relentlessly encroaching upon prime agricultural lands, 
governments and other land use and land management authorities are increasingly aware 
of the need to conserve open space lands. Faushold and Lilieholm describe the 
motivations behind this “drive to conserve” from three perspectives. First, they observe 
that open space areas are integral to the production of certain public goods and services 
such as food, fiber, recreation, natural hazards mitigation, and ecosystem services, and 
may in addition possess important geological and biological features (Faushold and 
  2Lilieholm,1996). Secondly, they characterize the heightened drive for conservation of 
open space as an attempt to counter the adverse effects of the socioeconomic and land use 
changes that come in the wake of declining urban cores and exurban sprawl (Faushold 
and Lilieholm, 1996). They also point out that open space preservation has significant 
fiscal implications for local governments that rely upon property tax revenues, so 
involvement in the decision-making process is critical for local authorities (Faushold and 
Lilieholm,1996). 
In the recent past, the growing literature on open space has followed one of 
several different paths. The most pursued research has been on hedonic studies that focus 
on the effect of open space and its associated amenities on property values (Irwin and 
Bockstael, 2001; Irwin and Bockstael, 2000). The methodology of this approach follows 
from the body of work on hedonic studies that examine the effects of 
locational/environmental characteristics on property values (Palmquist, 1992; Leggett 
and Bockstael, 2000; Tyrvainen and Miettinen, 2000). Although several willingness- to- 
pay studies have demonstrated the positive amenity value of open space (Halstead, 1984; 
Beasley et al, 1986), evidence from the hedonic studies are limited and mixed (Acharya 
and Bennett, 2001). 
An alternative approach to valuing open space has been that of directly estimating 
the public demand for open space (Bates and Santerra, 2002) with research in this area 
drawing heavily from the broad literature in public economics on demand for public 
goods( Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Santerra, 1985). 
Other research, not specific to open space, has concentrated on developing 
methodologies for investigating spatial interdependence among counties with respect to 
  3land-use changes (Hsieh et al, 2000) and land-use regulation (Hsieh et al, 2001). Findings 
from this research suggest that land-use models that fail to recognize the presence of 
certain types of spatial interdependence will suffer from specification error (Irwin and 
Bockstael, 2000). 
Strategic interaction, especially in the presence of externalities, has emerged as a 
important component in models of policy and government choice, because in the 
presence of externalities policy choices become interdependent, and such interactions 
must be explicitly accounted for in reaching optimal policy decisions (Brueckner, 1998). 
Much of the literature on strategic interaction is to be found in tax competition literature 
(Revelli, 2001); one close application in urban economics is found in the study of 
strategic interaction in the choice of urban growth control measures (Brueckner, 1995; 
Helsey and Strange, 1994). 
This paper integrates the methodology on strategic interactions in the public 
economics literature with the literature on the spillover benefits of open space by 
developing a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the problem of spatial interaction 
in land-use allocation decisions. It presents an amenity-based model of land-use decisions 
that is then used to examine micro level decision-making regarding land use in the 
presence of spillover open-space benefits and determine whether there are any benefits to 
be gained from strategic decision making across municipalities. 
 
 
  4The Model: An Amenity Based Model of Land Use decisions 
The detailed assumptions of the model are as follows. The decision-making unit 
of the local government is the municipality, denoted by i. For simplicity we begin with 
the assumption that there are two municipalities under consideration, i=1,2. 
Each municipality under consideration has unsettled, unoccupied land of area Ai 
and it must decide how to allocate this land between two alternative land uses-residential 
space (zi) and land that provides environmental amenities-which we call ‘open space.’ Let 
(bi) denote the proportion of available land that is provided as open space. Open space is 
assumed to be homogenous land with no distinction made between land that provides 
different type of environmental amenities. The model therefore, sticks to the restrictive 
assumption of featureless landscape that is found in many standard spatial equilibrium 
models (Solow, 1973). 
Each municipality has a fixed population of households (Ni) with similar 
preferences and income (Yi). Therefore each municipality can be characterized using the 
notion of a representative household. Population is mobile across the municipalities, and 
there are several constraints that each municipality faces: 
•  fixed utility 
•  a resource constraint dictating that resources used can not exceed income. 
•  a population constraint dictating that a given population of households 
must be accommodated and housed within the geographical boundaries of 
the municipalities. 
•  a land constraint requiring that the demand for residential space be equal 
to the supply in the municipalities. 
  5The representative household in each municipality chooses its most preferred 
combination of residential space (zi), proportion of the total land area that is provided as 
open space (bi) and a composite good (ci) to maximize its utility subject to a budget 
constraint (Yi). 
The representative household takes the rental price of the residential space 
denoted by ri as exogenous, but within the model rent is endogenously determined as a 
function of how much land remains for residential use and the size of the population that 
space has to support. 
Our purpose is to explore whether there are gains to be made if municipalities 
act strategically in the allocation of open space when they are making their land use 
decisions. To investigate the possibility of gains, we need to compare the results of a 
more regional, strategic decision making process with the ones obtained when those 
decisions are made nonstrategically. 
Therefore, there are several cases of the same optimizing behavior of the 
municipalities that are presented here; the difference between the three cases arises from 
the differences in the perspective that the decision-making agents have when they 
conduct the optimization procedure. 
 
 
Case 1: Model with no consideration of spillover effects 
In order to introduce the model, we first consider the case where the municipality 
assumes that the utility of its representative member depends only on the open space 
available within its geographical limit and makes it choice of zi and bi to maximize that 
resident’s utility. 
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)) ( , , ( i i i i i b c z U δ is the representative household’s utility function; 
) ( i i i A b δ is an index of the environmental amenities from provision of open space;  
Yi is the gross household income;  
Pc is the price of the composite good; 
i r is the rental price  
and λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. 
The household utility function adapted is as used in Solow (1973), but it is also 
modified as in Wu (2001) to depend on environmental amenities: 
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This specification implies that environmental amenities and residential space are 
substitutable: a small house in a good ‘green’ locality can provide the same level of 
utility as a larger house in a less desirable area. 
The first order conditions for the maximization problem can be distilled into the 
following system of equations: 
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Solution of this system of equation gives us the optimal choice of bi for municipality i. 
Combining equation (3a) and (3b) gives us the representative households demand 
for residential space zi. 








The spatial equilibrium condition can be solved using equation (4a). In each 
municipality the demand for residential space must equal supply. 
(4b)        i i i i A b z N ) 1 ( − =  
Using (4a) and (4b) the bid-rent price for housing is 










Differentiating equation (4c) with respect to bi and substituting it and equation 
(4b) in equation (3c) gives us the following differential equation, which must be satisfied 
for the municipality to be maximizing the representative resident’s utility: 



















The equilibrium system can be solved only when the precise form of the 
environmental amenities index δi(biAi) is specified. Previous hedonic studies of property 
values assume that amenities at a given site depend on distance to the nearest recreational 
  8area. Looking for simplicity in the context of the proposed model, assume that 
environmental amenity index for households in the ith municipality is 
(6)      δ ( i i b   ,         0 < γ<1 
γ ) ( ) i i A b =
Where γ is the elasticity of the environmental amenity index with respect to 
proportion of land allocated to open space. This specification implies that what 
contributes to utility is only the absolute amount of land that is provided as open space 
within each municipality. Where within the municipality it is located is of no 
consequence, for current purposes i.e. the spatial location of the amenity is not 
considered. 
Corresponding to this functional form for the amenity index, equation (5) changes 
to  
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Solution to the above equation gives the proportion of land that the municipality 
would choose to allocate to open space in equilibrium i.e. (bi*). 
In this case, it works out that 









1 b b  
The equilibrium allocation of land to open space depends exclusively onthe 
environmental amenity index parameter. For γ =0.5, we find bi* =0.33. The higher the 
value ofγ, the greater is the allocation of land to open space for either municipality. This 
makes intuitive sense as it tells us that the higher the amenity value of preserved land, the 
more is the land that is allocated to generate those amenities. 
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Case 2: Model with Spillover Effects and Non-Strategic Decision-Making 
We now alter the model to account for the spillover utility effect of open space. 
This expanded model will also be used to investigate the effects, and possible benefits 
derived from, strategic decision-making with respect to land-use allocation. The added 
spillover effect in this model is captured in an extra argument in the utility function that 
was not included in the previous case. 
Households living within a community get utility not only from the environmental 
amenities available within their own backyard but also from living next to communities 
that are green. Each household within a municipality therefore receives benefits not only 
from the open space that is provided within that municipality but also from all the open 
space that is provided in all other municipalities surrounding that particular municipality. 
In deciding on its allocation of open space, municipality i must now take into account the 
amount of open space provided for in the adjoining municipality j, j=1,2 and i≠ j. 
Therefore in contrast to the first case, municipality i now assumes that the utility 
of its representative member depends not only on the open space available within its own 
geographical limit but also on that which is available within the neighboring units (bj, i≠ 
j) and makes its choice of zi and bi given exogenous values of bj. Each municipality now 
alters their optimization procedure to account for this spatial interdependence. 
Mathematically, 
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) , ( j j i i i A b A b δ is an index of the environmental amenities from provision of bi and 
bj amount of open space;  
  is the bid-rent price for housing which now depends on both b i r i  and bj 
and everything else is unchanged. 
 
The household utility function now evolves to 
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As before, this specification again implies that environmental amenities and 
residential space are substitutable: a small house in a good ‘green’ locality (where the 
locality under consideration now extends over the geographical jurisdiction of the 
neighboring municipality) can provide the same level of utility as a larger house in a less 
desirable area. 
The first order conditions for this maximization problem can be distilled into the 
following system of equations: 
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  11Solution of this system of equations gives the optimal choice of bi for municipality 
i for exogenously determined values of bj. 
Combining equation (3a^) and (3b^) gives the representative household’s demand 
for residential space zi. 








The spatial equilibrium condition for municipality i– i.e. the constraint that 
demand for residential space must equal supply- implies: 
(4b^)      i i i i A b z N ) 1 ( − =  
As before, using (4a^) and (4b^), the bid-rent price for housing in each 
municipality is given by: 
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Differentiating equation (4c^) with respect to bi and substituting it, together with 
equation (4b^) back into equation (3c^) gives the following differential equation: 
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The only difference between this scenario and the one described in case 1 is that 
the environmental amenity index for households in the ith municipality now has bj as an 
argument. Intuitively, one might expect households to receive greater pleasure from 
amenities that are closer to their homes than farther away. Based on this, the 
environmental amenity index is defined to be: 
(5a^)     δi      0 < θ,γ<1, 
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  12where γ  is the elasticity of the environmental amenity index with respect to proportion of 
land allocated to open space, as before, and θ is the response parameter that determines 
how exogenously determined values of bj affect the environmental amenity index for 
municipality i. Higher the value of θ, the greater will be the amenity benefits derived by 
municipality 1 from a given amount of open space in municipality 2. 
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Solution to the above equation gives the proportion of land that municipality i would 
choose to allocate to open space in equilibrium given predetermined values of bj: 
(6^)  










As expected, a comparison of (6) and (6^) demonstrates that in the latter case, 
where spillover utility effects are taken into account from a neighboring municipality, 
land-use planners would choose to allocated less land to open space than when all utility 
is presumed to come from open space within one’s own municipality. The greater the 
amount of open space available in an adjacent municipality, or the higher the weight 
placed on that open space, the lower the amount of open space an optimizing decision-
maker will choose to allocate to open space in their own municipality. Reaction functions 
for each of the municipalities under a baseline parameter scenario 
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Figure1: Non Strategic equilibrium under symmetry 
 
Equation (6^) determines municipality 1's optimal choice of land in open space as 
a function of it’s belief about municipality 2's choice of land in open space; this 
relationship gives municipality 1's reaction curve (R1), and an analogous relationship 
determines municipality 2's reaction curve (R2). As both curves are downward sloping, 
they indicate that b1 and b2 are “strategic substitutes”-the more bi is, the less will be bj and 
vice versa. The intersection of the functions constitutes the Nash equilibrium of the land 
allocation game. The closed form solution for the Nash equilibrium works out to be: 
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b      i=1,2 ;  j=1,2, 
  14With the parameters set to the previous baseline values the Nash equilibrium 
allocation works out to be bi=bj=0.25. 
 
Case 3: Decision-making that incorporates spill-over utility effects and strategic 
decision-making 
Consideration of the spill-over effects of adjacent open space when making 
utility-maximizing land-use allocation decisions may be considered a type of strategic 
decision-making. In this section, however, we are interested in a different type of 
strategic consideration when making land-use decisions. In case 2, land-use allocation 
decisions considered the municipalities to be independent; each municipality decided, 
based on what adjacent municipalities allocated to open space, how much to allocate to 
open space in order to maximize the utility of their own residents. This structure, 
however, neglects that municipal boundaries are not impermeable; it is likely that 
residents will flow across the boundary in response to the different land-use decisions 
made in adjacent counties. This is a stylized illustration of Tiebout’s theory that residents 
will “vote with their feet” in choosing the residential jurisdiction that offers them their 
most preferred bundle of services and public goods. Residents on our landscape are not 
differentiated by their preferences, but the landscape may become differentiated if the 
two municipalities offer different “bundles” of rent and open space. In this study, we 
consider a strategic decision-maker to be one who considers the effects of their land-use 
allocation on the residential choice decisions of adjacent municipalities and allocates land 
accordingly. 
Under this scenario, the land-use planner will again choose an open space 
allocation to maximize the utility of a representative resident whose utility function 
  15incorporates the spill-over effects of open space in adjacent municipalities. Therefore, 
equations (1^) through (4a^) continue to apply to this optimization problem. However, 
under this scenario, the spatial equilibrium condition that each municipality faces differs. 
Under this scenario, the land-use planners assume that both municipalities together, 
rather than simply their own municipality, represent a closed system with exogenously 




i N i  is the initial 
or pre-equilibrium population in municipality i prior to any movement . In other words, 
the planners take into account that once they make a land-use allocation decision, the 
population between the two municipalities will redistribute so as to equalize utility 
between them. We are interested in exploring how this consideration will affect a land-
use planner’s decisions about open space allocation. 
To characterize an equilibrium of this sort, we need two further conditions. The 
first is a modified land constraint, which states that total demand for residential land 
across the two municipalities post all population movement must be equal to the total 
supply of land: 
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where ni is the final size of the population that chooses to live in municipality i or 
the post equilibrium population of municipality i and where ni  satisfies the following 
conditions: 

























  16The first condition reinforces the fact that the system is closed and initial 
population must match the post equilibrium population. The second condition indicates 
that in equilibrium there will be no unused space i.e. there is no wastage of land. 
A final constraint requires that the utility of representative households in each 
municipality must be equal. This reflects the fact that under the new equilibrium 
assumptions, representative households are assumed to have no incentive to relocate to 
the other municipality. 
For our two municipality case, this means 
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As before, 
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Differentiating equation (4c^) and (5a^) with respect to bi, we substitute it and 
equations (4b1^and 4b2^) into equation (3c^). This gives us an equation (see Appendix 
A) that determines the new equilibrium values of bi given exogenously provided values of 
bj. The environmental amenity index denoted by delta is as defined earlier in equation 
(5a^). 
An algebraic analytical closed form solution for bi is not possible in this case, so 
we calculated numerical solutions to the reaction functions derived from the above 
  17equation. That gives the proportion of land that municipality i would choose to allocate to 
open space in equilibrium (denoted by bi **) given predetermined values of (bj) and certain 
predetermined (baseline) parameter values for all other relevant parameters. These 
numerical solutions show how reaction values of bi vary as bj varies, under different 
parameter values of a, γ, and θ and different values of Ni, Yi and Ai. Both reaction 
functions are depicted in Fig. 2 for the symmetric case, in which parameters are assigned 
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Figure 2.  Reaction curves for α=0.5, γ=0.5, and θ=0.5 
In the presence of both spillover utility effects and strategic land-allocation 
behavior, the Nash equilibrium allocation occurs where b1=b2= .33. This equilibrium 
involves considerably more land set aside as open space than was set aside as a result of 
the non-strategic decision-making illustrated in Case 2 and Figure 2. 
  18When a land-use planner acknowledges the mobility of local residents, the 
allocation of land for every exogenously given value of adjacent open space will be 
greater than when that mobility is not considered. Under the strategic scenario, the land-
use planner is forced to consider not only the effect of their land-use allocation decision 
on their own residents, but on the residents of neighboring municipalities as well. This 
can be considered an example of the planner “internalizing a positive externality” which 
results in more of the good being provided. A land-use planner who fails to take into 
account the effect of open space on the utility of neighboring municipalities “under 
provides” open space. This decision results in lower rent in their own municipality 
because rent is directly proportional to the available open space. Under provision lowers 
both the amenity effect of open space on rent and the supply restriction for residential 
land. 
Municipal residents however continue to enjoy the benefits of open space from 
their neighbors. Such a situation is not stable if, as neighbor residents may have the 
incentive to move into the low-rent municipality, where they will continue to enjoy the 
benefits of the open space from their old municipality, albeit from slightly farther away. 
Land-use planners who consider this dynamic in their allocation decisions find that it is 
strategically optimal to increase their provision of open space, thereby perhaps 
forestalling major re-distributions of population and rent adjustments. 
Under symmetry both municipalities will choose that value of bi for which the 
absolute amount of land that is set aside as open space is identical for both municipalities. 
Then the environmental amenity index faced by all residents, irrespective of where they 
are located within the two municipalities, will be the same. This is because the 
  19environmental amenity index as designed depends on the absolute amount of land that is 
allocated to open space. Under symmetry, relocation is no longer a possibility as there is 
no scope of any transfer of benefits between the two competing needs of amenities and 
residential space. 
It is to be noted that the resulting allocation is the same as the allocation that 
would result should both municipalities engage in the independent, non-strategic 
decision-making illustrated in case A. This result emerges from the symmetry of the 
problem; when two identical municipalities with symmetrical spillover effects maximize 
their joint utility, the resulting decisions are the same as those they would have made in 
isolation. 
 
Reaction Functions under asymmetry 
In real life, municipalities tend to be dissimilar in their geographical, 
demographical and income layout. In cases 1 and 2, differences between the 
municipalities had no effect on a municipality’s optimal allocation. When a land-use 
planner adopts a more regional perspective in their land-use allocation decisions, 
however, and acknowledges the mobility of all regional residents, differences between 
municipalities can be quite significant in determining how land should be allocated. 
 
Area Asymmetry 
When asymmetry in area is incorporated into the model, the resulting equilibrium 
values for b1 and b2 are different from the previous asymmetrical case. For the case 
where the area of municipality 2 (A2 = 8000) is greater than the area of municipality 1 (A1 
  20= 4000), the equilibrium values turn out to be b1 =0.282 and b2 =0.355. This is illustrated 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium intersection under area asymmetry. 
When the municipalities differ significantly in size, the optimization procedure 
results in the smaller municipality allocating a smaller proportion of land to open space. 
The presence of strategic interaction is most evident. The land endowment of 
municipality 2 is so enormous (A2 = 8000) that municipality 2 knows that even if 
municipality 1 was not to allocate any land to open space, it will not provide any more for 
open space than .45 of its total land endowment. There is therefore ample scope here for 
the smaller municipality to be strategic about its disadvantage in land endowment. Had 
they engaged in non-strategic decision making, then both municipalities, taking 
advantage of the large land endowment, would have ended up with poor allocations to 
open space, the larger municipality still providing more than the smaller one, though not 
  21as high as it does in the equilibrium that is finally obtained. With population having the 
option to relocate to the municipality in which they wish to reside, such allocation would 
not have resulted in an equilibrium. 
If under such circumstance, the smaller municipality also provides too low an 
amount in open space and thereby makes more land available as residential space, the 
amenity effect on rents being low along with decreased supply restriction on land, the 
rents will also be much lower in the smaller municipality. This will attract migration of 
neighboring residents into the smaller municipality.   
Increased congestion pressures results in higher rents in the smaller municipality. 
By allocating less to open space, the municipality has to host additional population 
without being able to enjoy additional residential space. The best strategy for the smaller 
municipality, since it cannot match the amenity benefits provided by the larger 
municipality will be to provide higher residential space. So while the larger municipality 
specializes in providing open space, the smaller specializes in creating residential space. 
Both municipalities are aware that residents will continue to move between the 
two municipalities till the utility they obtain from either municipality is equal i.e. that is 
they have no incentive to move from wherever they are located. Residents will continue 
relocating themselves from the larger municipality 2 to the smaller one till the loss in 
benefits they obtain from the lower amenities of municipality 1 equate the increase in 
benefits they obtain from the additional residential space they obtain in municipality 1. 
In equilibrium, in terms of absolute amount of land that is set aside as open space, 
the smaller municipality allows for 1129.08 units of land as open space while 
municipality 2 allows for a much larger 2843.37 units of land as open space.   The 
  22amenity index for municipality 1 (δ1=50.502) is lower than that of municipality 2 
(δ2=58.377). The amenity effects of rent lead to rents being higher for municipality 2 than 
municipality 1. However in equilibrium residents of municipality 1 enjoy a greater 
amount of residential space (z1 =0.735 > z2 = 0.636) than residents of municipality 2.The 
larger municipality supports the greater portion of the total population in the closed 
system. 
Residents of the larger municipality are therefore paying a higher rent for a much 
lower amount of residential space but they are willing to do so because by locating in the 
larger municipality, they are getting to enjoy higher amenity benefits. They trade off 
additional residential space for increased amenity benefits. On the other hand, the 
residents of the smaller municipality pay a lower rent than the larger municipality but 
they get to enjoy more residential space than that they would have enjoyed in the larger 
municipality. The trade off they make is reduced amenity benefits for additional living 
space. 
The larger portion of the population will locate themselves in the larger 
municipality while residents who choose to live in the smaller one are the ones who 
choose the combination of low amenity benefits but more residential space.  
 
Income Asymmetry 
Income asymmetry refers to the case where, due to differences in municipal 
development or proximity to an urban area, representative income levels differ between 
the two municipalities under consideration. Figure 4 illustrates the case where the income 
of residents of municipality 1 is increased to $90,000, with all other parameters held 

















































Figure 4. Allocation under income asymmetry. 
As a result of asymmetry in income, the Nash equilibrium occurs at an allocation 
where the relatively less affluent municipality sets aside more open space (b2 =0.568) 
than the relatively richer one (b1 =0.177). In terms of absolute land allotted as open space 
this means that the more affluent allocates only 1417 units of the available 8000 to open 
space while the less affluent allocates 4551 units of the available 8000 to the same.  In 
this case, we find that the less affluent municipality ends up allocating more to open 
space in comparison to the more affluent municipality. Similar strategic considerations as 
those that played under area asymmetry also work here. If in view of the income 
disadvantage, the less affluent municipality ignoring demographic dynamics tries to over 
provide residential space for its residents (relative to the equilibrium), it will end up 
allocating less land to open space. The reduced amenity effect on rent and the reduced 
  24restrictions on supply of residential space will lower rents in the less affluent 
municipality. This will attract neighboring residents into municipality 2. Congestion will 
increase rents in municipality 2 in turn. Municipality 2 then faces increased rents without 
the benefit of additional residential space. 
The less affluent will therefore strategically always choose bi such that the 
environmental amenity index faced by residents who choose to locate themselves in that 
municipality is higher than that faced by residents in the more affluent municipality. In 
equilibrium, the less affluent municipality 2 enjoys a higher amenity index 
(δ2=72.524>δ1=60.768), higher per unit residential space (z2 =1.114 > z1 = 0.739) and 
faces a lower rent than the more affluent municipality 2. Municipality 1 provides a much 
lower combination of amenity benefits and residential space but it allows the residents 
more income to be spent on ‘all other goods’ or the composite good of our model (c1 
=45000 > c2 =25000). In equilibrium therefore the larger portion of the initial population 
settles in the more affluent municipality, the demographic effect on rent resulting in a 
higher rent for lower amenity benefits and lower residential space but greater 
consumption of ‘all other goods’. 
 
Extensions 
Further extensions planned include foremost an extension of the two-municipality 
model into a multi municipality model so that a better and more realistic regional 
perspective can be obtained.  The effect of varying initial endowment of open space on 
the land planners’ decisions will also be considered.  
 
 
  25Conclusions 
Our results suggest that when land-use planners adopt a more regional perspective 
in their land allocation decisions, their utility optimization process results in greater 
consideration of open space benefits and a greater allocation of land to open space. This 
regional perspective is the logical consequence of the assumption that discontinuous 
utility levels are unlikely to exist on an otherwise homogeneous landscape in which 
residents are free to relocate. Each municipality’s optimal allocation is therefore also 
sensitive to asymmetries in characteristics such as municipal area or income, or any other 
characteristic that affects the utility level of current residents. We are currently working 
on more in-depth analysis of the effects of municipal asymmetries on asymmetries in 
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     This equation implicitly defines cell i’s response to an exogenously given value of bj. 
Solving two equations simultaneously for cell i’s response to bj and cell j’s response to bi 
generates the solution that represents the equilibrium solution in this analysis. 
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